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Game theory lies at the heart of modern industrial organization. Over the second half of
the last century, it provided a sound foundation to the main equilibrium concepts adopted
in classical industrial economics, as in Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg models. It also
allowed to build up new and rigorous conceptual frameworks for many industrial organization
topics, as product di¤erentiation, predation, delegation, mergers, collusion and R&D in
imperfectly competitive markets. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, over the years
game theory has constantly continued to inspire new research grounds in the eld of industrial
organization which, in some cases, went far beyond the scope of the discipline. This occurred,
for instance, in the development of dynamic and incomplete information games or in the
recent applications of game theory to law and economics, networks, digital economy, auctions,
experiments, health economics, intellectual property rights, contests and corruption, just to
cite a few. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the relationship between game theory
and industrial organization has never been unidirectional.1
Thus, it is not exaggerated to say that game theory has become the common language of
industrial organization.2 In particular the adoption of a sound mathematical language has
allowed industrial organization to steadily progress towards new and unexplored elds. As
an example, the recent use of experimental game theory for industrial economics has opened
the door to behavioral models for the explanation of the bias of consumers and sellers in the
market.3
Due to the increasing interlink between game theory and industrial organization, the
current volume aims to provide a solid introduction to the main topics lying at the crossroads
between these two disciplines. In managing such a - seemingly arduous - task, our major
contribution as editors was mainly to attract an impressive array of renown economists in the
challenge to yield up-to-date surveys for the volume. As a nal result, and specially thanks
to the outstanding quality of the contributors, the current Handbook appears suitable to
both established researchers as well as to graduate and advanced undergraduate students.
Given the wide heterogeneity of topics being at the boundary between game theory and
industrial organization, our primary task in assembling the volume was to give a rational
structure to the great amount of material gathered for its preparation.
In our nal plan for the Handbook we judged as appropriate to divide the volume in ve
subsets of distinct topics: (i) Basic games in industrial organization; (ii) Dynamic games in
industrial organization; (iii) Information and search; (iv) Collusion and mergers; (v) Special
topics.
More specically, part I of the Handbook aims at providing an overview of the basic
game-theoretic tools currently used in modern industrial organization, as lattice techniques,
aggregative games, monopolistic competition models, oligopoly models with product di¤er-
entiation, welfare analysis and contest theory.
1As observed by Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002): "First, the needs of industrial organization fed back and
exerted a general inuence on the agenda of game theory. Second, specic ideas that grew out of problems
in industrial organization gained independent importance as game theoretic topics in their own right. Third,
it is mostly through industrial organization that game theory was brought on large scale into economics and
achieved its current standing as a fundamental branch of economic theory. (Bagwell and Wolinsky, 2002,
p.1852).
2This is conrmed, if ever needed, by Fudenberg and Tiroles long survey contained in the Handbook
of Industrial Economics (1989) actually encompassing most of the relevant topics in noncooperative game
theory.
3See the survey on "Experimental Industrial Organization" by Brandts and Potters in this Handbook.
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Part II introduces the state of the art in the literature applying dynamic games to well-
known dynamic industrial organization issues as Stackelberg, entry, learning, evolutionary,
environment and endogenous timing games.
Part III provides an overview of some important classes of models dealing with informa-
tional issues in imperfectly competitive markets, as trading under asymmetric information,
principal-agent under moral hazard, information-sharing in oligopoly, rm pricing in presence
of consumer search and learning in markets.
Part IV aims at surveying both cooperative and noncooperative games commonly adopted
for the analysis of horizontal mergers, rm collusion in vertically di¤erentiated markets,
leniency e¤ects in cartels and coordinated e¤ects in mergers.
Finally, part V presents a wide range of relevant applications of game theory to industrial
organization as those of strategic delegation, liability and product safety, platforms and
networks, auctions, intellectual property rights, healthcare market, corruption, all analyzed
through rigorous game-theoretic settings. Last but not least, two excellent surveys dealing
with the recent advances in experimental industrial organization and empirical models of
rmsR&D conclude part V and the volume. In the next sections we enter in more detail
in the content of all single chapter composing the Handbook.
1. Part I: Basic games in industrial organization
In the chapter on strategic complementarities in oligopoly Xavier Vives provides a detailed
overview of many recent results obtained by applying the techniques of supermodular games
to the analysis of rm behaviour in imperfect competitive markets. Beside o¤ering an ex-
cellent introduction to the recent lattice-theoretic methods, the chapter reviews the results
obtained in the existence and comparative statics of Cournot, Bertrand, R&D, advertising,
multidimensional and multimarket competition models. In addition, it introduces the use of
supermodularity for the analysis of well-known classes of two-stage dynamic games as entry,
dynamic strategic incentives and both Markov and incomplete information games applied to
voluntary disclosures and auctions.
In the chapter on the existence and comparative statics in Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly,
Rabah Amir surveys two important strands of literature in oligopoly theory, one dealing with
the existence of Cournot equilibrium in the general asymmetric and symmetric cases and
the other with the e¤ects of exogenous entry on market performance in a Cournot industry.
This chapter emphasizes that these two strands of literature share one important unifying
common feature: both are achieved via the application of lattice-theoretic methods. This
also provides a bridge with the previous chapter.
In aggregative games Martin Kaae Jensen nicely complements the rst two chapters by
introducing three important classes of widely used aggregative games: (i) linearly aggregative
games; (ii) generalized aggregative games; (iii) quasi aggregative games. These games are
very useful in industrial organization since they drastically simplify the analysis of existence,
comparative statics and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and unify a vast amount of literature
since they apply to a wide array of models like Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, tournaments,
work in teams, contests, patent races and network games.
In the following chapter monopolistic competition with no apology, Jacques Thisse and
Philip Ushchev review what has been accomplished under the heading of monopolistic com-
petition in industrial organization and in other closely related economic elds. Among other
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things, the authors argue that monopolistic competition is a market structure in its own
right which encompasses a much broader set-up than the celebrated constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) model. Also, although oligopolistic and monopolistic competition com-
pete for adherents within the economics profession, the authors explain how such dichotomy
is, to a large extent, unwarranted, being both models complements rather than substitutes.
In oligopoly and product di¤erentiation Jean Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola overview
old and new oligopoly models on product di¤erentiation characterized by local competi-
tion. Starting by the microeconomic theory of consumer demand based on characteristics,
as introduced by Gorman (1956 and 1980) and then popularized by Lancaster (1966), they
present the horizontal product di¤erentiation as based on Hotelling (1929) and vertical prod-
uct di¤erentiation as based on Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). Finally, they review the model
nesting both horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation and propose two applications of
this approach, one based on network externalities and the other on environmental economics.
In his chapter on oligopolistic competition and welfare, Robert Ritz nicely reviews the
recent developments in the study of social welfare in oligopoly markets. In particular, the
chapter covers the usefulness of the rate of cost pass-through for the analysis of market
performance and includes a careful analysis of welfare losses due to market power in various
widely-used models (with symmetric and asymmetric rms, and with or without endogenous
entry).
In the nal chapter of part I, Contest theory: a survey, Luis Corchón and Marco Serena
introduce the readers to the main ingredients of contests, with a focus on how the e¤orts of
the agents translate into probabilities of winning (i.e., the contest success function). In the
second part of the survey, they focus on some extensions of the basic model, with a particular
interest on dynamics, information and groups. They use the popular lottery model of contest
with heterogenous contestants to highlight their equilibrium properties and to review some
results on how a designer can optimally design the contest.
2. Part II: Dynamic games in industrial organization
This second part of the book o¤ers a collection of chapters focussing on the use of dynamic
games in a set of well known industrial organization issues.
The initial chapter by Klaus Ritzenberger on dynamic games sets the ground by intro-
ducing three alternative denitions of game trees and extensive forms and also discussing
in detail their pros and cons. In the following sections, the author comes back to the nor-
mal form associated to the extensive form and explains the concept of perfect recall and its
signicance for economic applications.
In Strategic Renements, Carlos Pimienta examines the classical literature on equilibrium
renements. Starting with Nashs denition of equilibrium, the chapter presents a compre-
hensive review of the most successful equilibrium concepts adopted in economic applications
as well as the most recent contributions to the subject. The chapter explains in detail how
a few decision-theoretic criteria - admissibility, backwards induction, forward induction and
invariance - shape the denition of stable sets of equilibria and how they translate into their
corresponding mathematical formulation.
In Stackelberg games Ludovic Julien introduces three classes of deterministic noncooper-
ative Stackelberg games with increasing level of generality. The rst is the basic duopoly
game. The second is the oligopoly multiple leader-follower game. The third extends the
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multiple leader-follower setup within the framework of bilateral oligopoly to describe a multi-
commodity market. In each case, the author denes and characterizes the equilibrium and
the welfare consequences of market power. The chapter also considers the issues of endoge-
nous timing, merging and free entry.
In the chapter on entry games and free entry equilibria, Michele Polo reviews the theoret-
ical literature on these two fundamental topics. He shows how a wide range of symmetric
oligopoly models share some common comparative statics properties. Individual prots and
quantities decrease in the number of rms, and tend to competitive or monopolistic com-
petitive equilibria when the number of rms increases indenitely. The maximum number
of rms sustainable in a symmetric long-run equilibrium are shown to depend on technology
(economies of scale), preferences (market size) and strategies (toughness of price competi-
tion). On the normative side, in homogeneous product markets the business stealing e¤ect
drives the result of excessive entry, whereas adding product di¤erentiation and the utility
from variety may revert this result. In addition the author considers asymmetric free entry
equilibria using the aggregative nature of many oligopoly models as we noted before. Finally,
he discusses the issue of endogenous sunk costs, persistent concentration and frictionless en-
try in contestable markets.
In their chapter Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive players, Gian
Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi analyze the properties of evolutionary switch-
ing models in oligopoly games, where boundedly rational agents can follow di¤erent behav-
ioral rules (or heuristics) to update their production through repeated adaptive decisions. In
particular, they focus on well known heuristics such as best replies with naive expectations,
local monopolistic approximation and gradient dynamics on marginal prots. Hence, the
chapter examines some specic examples of evolutionary systems where the coexistence of
heterogeneous behaviors and of oscillatory time patterns are obtained as possible outcomes.
In the chapter on di¤erential oligopoly games in environment and resource economics,
Luca Lambertini o¤ers a comprehensive overview of the literature based on di¤erential games
whose main focus is the interplay between either regulated or unregulated oligopolistic rms
prot incentives and the preservation of the stock of natural capital. The rst section
introduces Cournot oligopoly games with either polluting emissions or resource extraction
under open-loop rules, without regulation on emissions or access to the commons. The second
section reviews the literature on environmental games with feedback structures, where rms
may be subject to emission taxes and possibly activate R&D projects for green technologies.
The third section considers games with exploitation of renewable and nonrenewable resources.
The nal sections are devoted, in turn, to the corporate environmentalism and to the Porters
assumption as well as to the issue of international trade and the environment, both crucial
for the ongoing debate on globalization and climate change.
In the nal chapter of part II, endogenous timing in contests, Magnus Ho¤mann and
Grégoire Rota- Graziosi survey the extensive literature on endogenous timing in contests.
They rstly introduce the structure of a two-player contest with either simultaneous or
sequential moves and xed prizes. They then present the case of ubiquitous contests with
e¤ort-dependent prizes, in which timing is endogenously determined. Finally, they conclude
by looking in detail at the literature on sequential play, endogenous timing, and commitment
in contests.
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3. Part III: Information and search
This third part of the Handbook look at the e¤ects on markets by relaxing the assumption
of symmetric information.
In their chapter trading under asymmetric information: positive and normative impli-
cations, Andrea Attar and Claude dAspremont mainly focus their attention on screening
models. They divide the chapter in two parts. The rst part adopts a simple mechanism
design approach with only one mechanism designer. When the mechanism designer is an
outsider (say a public authority), all traders may have private information and play simul-
taneously. When the mechanism designer is an insider (a principal, buyer or seller), he is
uninformed and has no private information. Three illustrative applications are taken into
account: bilateral trade, auctions and insurance. In the second part of the chapter these
model are extended to the case of several principals who are uninformed and have no private
information but compete by designing mechanisms.
In moral hazard: base models and two extensions, Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez-
Castrillo analyze rst the optimal contracts in static moral hazard situations, where the
agents e¤ort is not veriable. Then, they present the main trade-o¤s of the principal-agent
model. Furthermore, they treat in detail the trade-o¤ of incentives (motivation) vs. risk-
sharing (e¢ ciency), incentives vs. rents (when the agent is protected by limited liability),
incentives to a task vs. incentives to another (in a multitask situation), and incentives to
the agent vs. incentives to the principal (when both exert a non-veriable e¤ort). Finally,
they discuss how the predictions of the classical moral hazard model are a¤ected when: (i)
there are behavioral biases of individuals and, (ii) in presence of a matching market.
In their chapter information sharing in oligopoly, Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri
review the theoretical literature on information sharing in oligopoly and discuss some recent
contributions extending the traditional multilateral model to encompass the possibility of
bilateral sharing agreements. In the rst part of the survey the authors revisit the early
insights of the literature, stressing the role of quantity vs. price competition and of common
vs. private values. In the second part, following some more recent contributions, they discuss
the bilateral model of information sharing, stressing the role of signalscorrelation for the
emergence of information sharing in equilibrium and its e¤ect on the architecture of sharing
networks. Finally, they conclude the analysis by discussing the emergence of core-periphery
networks when rms possess asymmetric information.
In rm, pricing with consumer search, Simon Anderson and Regis Renault discuss in
detail the basic concepts underpinning the theory of imperfectly competitive markets with
consumer search. They rst stress how the appropriate theoretical frameworks should involve
su¢ cient heterogeneity among agents on both sides of the market. Moreover, they explain
why the analysis of ordered search constitutes an essential ingredient for modeling recent
search environments. Finally, they examine in detail the important issue of the impact of
the reduced search cost on prices, variety, product choice and advertising practices.
In the conclusive chapter of part III on learning in markets, Amparo Urbano surveys the
problem of market learning as well as that of experimentation (or active market learning) in
dynamic models incorporating a Bayesian expectation revision mechanism. Through the lens
of this perspective, she reviews the extensive literature on this topic. The experimentation
literature has by and large focused on broadly dened bandit models, and thus the starting
point is the monopolist experimentation with the classic two-armed bandit problem. The
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essay extends to surveying the impact of price competition on experimentation, the role of
externalities in social learning and learning in experience good markets.
4. Part IV: Collusion and mergers
In this part of the volume we gather a group of contributions on collusion and mergers
in oligopolies. In the rst chapter coalitions and networks in oligopolies, Francis Bloch
reviews the models on endogenous formation of coalitions and networks in oligopolies. It
weaves together a literature in game theory on cooperation and a literature in industrial
organization on the formation of groups of oligopolistic rms. The discussion of cooperation
in oligopolies starts with a brief presentation of the game-theoretic models used to predict
the formation of coalitions and networks. Two di¤erent forms of cooperation are considered:
(i) cartels and horizontal mergers; (ii) strategic alliances, which encompass both research
joint ventures and information exchange platforms.
In the chapter on TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperation, Jingang Zhao surveys
the existing results on TU cooperative games applied to oligopolies and lists nine promising
future areas for TU oligopoly games. On the theoretical side, TU oligopoly games are
shown to make advances on the renements and applications of the core, one of the most
important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. On the empirical side, the author
shows how cooperative games can allow the analysis of industrial cooperation and, hence, the
understanding of all forces at work behind industrial changes with and without regulatory
policies.
In horizontal mergers in oligopoly, Ramon Faulí-Oller and Joel Sandonis analyze in turn
the case of exogenous and endogenous mergers. In addition, the chapter examines in detail
the models of horizontal mergers in vertically related industries and the models of mergers
in an international setting, also looking at their welfare consequences.
In collusive agreements in vertically di¤erentiated markets, Marco Marini introduces a
number of game-theoretic tools which can be used to model the collusion between rms in a
vertically di¤erentiated market. The chapter starts reviewing the classical literature on two-
rm collusion and then the analysis is extended to a n-rm vertically di¤erentiated market
to study the incentive to form either a whole market cartel or partial cartels made of subsets
of rms colluding in prices. It is shown that a su¢ cient condition for the coalitional stability
of the whole market cartel is the equidistance of rmsproducts along the quality spectrum.
Also, adopting a standard innitely repeated game approach, it is shown how an increase in
the number of rms in the market may have contradictory e¤ects on the incentive of rms
to collude. Finally, by means of a three-rm example, it is studied the case of alliances with
endogenous qualities.
In their chapter cartels and leniency: taking stock of what we learnt, Catarina Marvao and
Giancarlo Spagnolo study leniency policies. These policies reduce or cancel the sanctions
for the rst rm(s) that self-report being part of a cartel. They have become the main
enforcement instrument used by competition authorities to ght against cartels. Hence, it is
vital for competition authorities to understand how leniency programs a¤ect rmsincentives,
in order to optimize their design and administration. In this chapter, the authors review
some of the key studies which have been undertaken to date, with emphasis on more recent
contributions and highlight the main results and their limitations. The chapter concludes
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with a general assessment and an agenda for future research on this topic at the core of
competition policy.
In the nal chapter of part IV, coordinated e¤ects in mergers, Natalia Fabra and Massimo
Motta focus on the analysis of coordinated e¤ects in merger cases, i.e., the possibility that,
after a merger, rms can increase their market power by coordinating their actions. The
authors explain what coordinated e¤ects are and how they can be assessed. For this purpose,
they review the economic meaning of collusion, and assess the factors that allow rms to
reach and enforce collusive outcomes. They also review some approaches for identifying and
quantifying coordinated e¤ects in practice, and provide an overview of the use of coordinated
e¤ects in European merger control.
5. Part V: Special topics
This last part of the Handbook is devoted to present wide array of applications of game
theory to specic industrial organization topics.
In the rst chapter strategic delegation in oligopoly, Michael Kopel and Mario Pezzino
provide the reader with a clear and intuitive description of the topic of strategic managerial
incentives under oligopolistic competition. They describe in detail the related models of
vertical separation, where a manufacturer delegates her decisions to a retailer, and the agent
appointment game, where a principal delegates her decisions to a certain type of agent. Each
of these themes is presented by discussing the seminal paper that has rst introduced the
topic, its key assumptions and its applications along with some empirical and experimental
evidence. The contributions that have provided important extensions to the basic frameworks
are also discussed in a nal section of the chapter.
In market structure, liability, and product safety, Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Rein-
ganum consider how models of imperfect competition provide insight into an important area
of law: products liability, which is liability for harms and losses associated with goods and
services sold via markets. Traditional law and economics analyses of products liability gen-
erally nd no role for market structure or strategic interaction to inuence safety or liability
policy. Rather, di¤erent liability regimes, and alternative market structures, lead to the same
private choice of safety, and this private choice is socially optimal. Daughety and Reinganum
nd that two simple (but plausible) model modications, cumulative harm or endogenous
xed costs, yield a substantial impact of market structure on the choice of safety and liability
regime.
In the chapter platforms and network e¤ects, Paul Belleamme and Martin Peitz review
the key ndings of the literature on network e¤ects and two-sided platforms. They explore
how to dene network e¤ects and markets with platforms, and investigate market demand
and the provision of network goods. Then they lay out the basic models of monopoly
platforms and platform competition, and elaborate on some routes taken by recent research.
In the chapter on auctions, Angel Hernando-Veciana provides an overview of the advances
in the auction eld that have taken place in the last decade. To this aim, the survey starts
with an introductory section in which the basic tools of analysis are summarized. Next,
the main advances occurred in three innovative areas of auction theory are spelled out in
detail: position auctions, internet auctions and combinatorial auctions. The nal section of
the chapter summarizes the major contributions to auction theory organized by topics.
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In Intellectual property, Miguel González-Maestre discusses the current literature on in-
tellectual property right from a perspective taking into account two main features of the
evolution of modern economies: (i) the increasing level of complexity associated with the
production and design of goods, and (ii) the rapid development of new technologies of infor-
mation and communication. To this end, the chapter mainly focusses on the recent literature
dealing with the role of technological changes on the optimal design of patents and copy-
rights. This overview suggests that the substantial changes observed in Western economies,
aiming at reinforcing intellectual property rights, cannot be justied neither theoretically
nor empirically on the grounds of welfare or of creative and innovational incentives. Instead,
alternative explanations based on rent-seeking and lobbying activities by copyright or patent
holders emerge as their most plausible rationale.
In his chapter on healthcare and health insurance markets, Pau Olivella introduces some
modelling tools for the analysis of healthcare provision and health insurance. In particular,
the chapter devotes great attention to a series of topics for which the tools of industrial
organization and game theory have proven most fruitful: (i) rmsincentives to invest in
R&D in the pharmaceutical industry; (ii) risk selection and screening of consumers; (iii) the
e¤ect of hospitalscompetition.
In themicroeconomics of corruption. A review of thirty years of research, Roberto Burguet,
Juan José Ganuza and José Garcia Montalvo review the most recent research on corruption.
They start by analyzing the seminal models of corruption built on three-tier delegation mod-
els. Then, they discuss the case of corrupted deals to see which main economic factors a¤ect
corruption. Incentives and compensations in bureaucracies, as well as the strict interplay of
market and bureaucracies are discussed. Competition and contract design are also reviewed
in relation to procurement in presence of corruptible agents. After reviewing theory, the
authors turn to empirical evidence. Finally, they critically evaluate several anti-corruption
mechanisms proposed by the literature to both control and eliminate illegal activities.
In the chapter on experimental industrial organization, Jordi Brandts and Jan Potters
present a selective survey of the recent experimental studies on industrial organization issues.
The rst section of the chapter presents, starting with the classical models of Cournot,
Bertrand and Stackelberg, the results of experiments based on static models involving the
choices of quantities and prices. The second section deals with tacit collusion. The third
section covers horizontal product di¤erentiation and the fourth discusses experience and
credence goods. The last section presents a few studies on entry deterrence and R&D
competition.
In the conclusive chapter empirical models of rmsR&D, Andres Barge, Elena Huergo,
Alberto López and Lourdes Moreno survey the ever growing empirical literature of R&D.
This literature is still growing just because of the increasing availability of micro-data. Taking
this fact into account, the main purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of three
important topics covered by the literature: the determinants of rmsR&D investment, the
link between R&D, innovation and productivity, the analysis of the R&D black box. This
chapter is presented as an invitation to IO practitioners, both theorists and applied, to cross
the bridge (and change sides) between theory and applications.
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